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Abstract
Why do states intervene in elections abroad? We argue that outsiders intervene when the
main domestic contenders for office adopt policy positions that differ from the point of view of
the outside power. We refer to the split between the government’s and opposition’s positions
as policy polarization. Polarization between domestic political forces, rather than the degree of
unfriendliness of the government in office, is what attracts interventions of two types: process
(for or against democracy) and candidate (for or against the government) interventions. We
provide a novel, original data set to track the policy positions of local contenders. We show
that the new policy polarization measurement outperforms a number of available alternatives
when it comes to explaining process and candidate interventions. We use it to explain the
behavior of the United States as an intervener in elections over the period 1945 to 2012. The
United States is more likely to support the opposition, and the democratic process abroad,
if a pro-US opposition is facing an anti-US government. It is is more likely to support the
government, and undermine the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US government is facing
an anti-US opposition. We also present results for all interveners, confirming the results from
the US case.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic accusations of foreign interference in the 2016 US Presidential election put the issue
of foreign meddling in elections front and central in public and scholarly debates. Yet, at present,
we have only an incomplete theoretical grasp of the causes of foreign meddling in elections, and
few empirical tools to explain the occurrence of interventions.
Elections are a contest for power: in the simplest rendition, a set of government candidates and
a slate of opposition candidates compete for victory. An election intervention may change the
odds of victory of one ticket, and thus alter the relative weights of the expected policy outcomes
after the election. This gives outside powers a straightforward motivation to intervene: they would
intervene if they expect that it would make a difference for post-election policy. How attractive an
intervention is, then, depends on the importance of the policy at stake, the difference a victory for
one or the other set of candidates will make policy-wise, and on the likelihood of an intervention
succeeding in securing a victory of the supported ticket.
While all parts of the calculus of intervention need careful study, here we focus on the first two ele-
ments. We study the importance of policy polarization, which we define as the difference between
the positions of the leading contenders on the issue of relations with the outside power, as a factor
for interventions. We also study the types of issues that give rise to policy contention between
states.
Since the scholarship on external election interventions is relatively young, we turn to other bodies
of research to find our points of departure. International relations scholarship speaks of the im-
portance of friendly governments in place in other states. A friendly government is less likely to
pose military challenges (Goemans et al. 2009), may become an ally (Lake 2007; Kinne 2012),
offer support in international fora such as the United Nations (Bailey et al. 2017a), or prove to be
a reliable trading partner (Russett et al. 1999). Extending the logic of this insight to interventions,
a reasonable conjecture is that election interventions are deployed to secure a friendly leader at the
helm of another state’s government.
While we agree that countries seek friendly governments abroad, we note a crucial oversight.
International relations scholars typically only take into consideration the position of the current
government. Yet, most countries in the world hold elections to decide which party will rule. As
described by Wagner et al. (2018, 540), “there has been very little attention to parties as ideational
and political agents in security policy.” The current literature essentially assumes that if a country is
acting in an unfriendly manner to the United States, and the government is replaced as a result of an
election intervention, the post-intervention government will pursue more friendly policies toward
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the intervening power (Levin 2016). For us, what matters is the competition for power between
different parties. Knowing the orientation and policies of the government in office supplies only
part of the puzzle. One would also need to know whether the opposition favors policy continuity
or change to understand the true attractiveness of election interventions.
Comparative politics has investigated the types of policy promises made by parties (whether in
government or opposition) to voters in order to get voters to support the party. Once elected, the
party is expected to enact the policy mandate it offered, even though exceptions do occur.1 This
concerns policies that may be of interest to outside powers. For example, recent studies show
that the deployment decisions and the institutional oversight of military missions are contested
between government and opposition parties in Western democracies (Wagner et al. 2017, 2018).
The question thus is what would outsiders do to affect the domestic scramble for power which
determines, at least in part, future policy.
We start out by linking foreign interest in elections to policy divisions in the state that may be tar-
geted by interventions. We define two types of election interventions: one designed to strengthen
or weaken the rules of the game, and one designed to boost the support for a specific candidate.
An example of the former is helping to organize clean elections, an example of the latter is condi-
tioning foreign assistance on who wins. We argue that policy polarization between incumbent and
opposition should predict both types of interventions, since they are alternative or complementary
means of boosting a candidate’s chance of victory. When foreigners like the incumbent over the
opposition, they will invest in weakening the democratic rules of the game, and in generating more
support for the incumbent. When the opposition is preferable, foreign actors will seek to strengthen
the rules of the game, and boost the vote-share of the opposition. We demonstrate the theoretical
importance of taking both the government’s and the opposition’s positions into account.
We then select a random sample of elections held around the world. We use a variety of sources
to classify the policy positions of the governing and opposition parties on issues of concern to
potential external interveners. Based on our novel Process-Party dataset, we obtain a measurement
of candidate positions. We define policy polarization as the difference between the incumbent and
opposition on relations with the outside power. Our measurement of polarization yields a natural
expectation of when we may see election interventions: when the outsider prefers one domestic
actor to win based on their policy positions.
We demonstrate the utility of the exercise by comparing our polarization measurement to two well-
known potential alternatives available in the literature: a measurement of policy-alignment based
on a country’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting record (Bailey et al. 2017a),
1There is an enormous corpus of work: three recent contributions are Stokes (2001); Bawn and Somer-Topcu
(2012); Jäger (2017).
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and the left-right ranking of party policy positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
(Volkens et al. 2018). When measuring foreign election intervention, our measurement outper-
forms the other two alternatives as it has less noise and is less likely to be biased as compared to
the available alternatives.
Our theoretical approach should be useful for future research. Scholars can study the importance of
different types of democratic institutions, different degrees of democratic consolidation, different
cultural or geo-strategic contexts for foreign interventions. It can also help a variety of research
and policy agendas, including research on the democratic peace (Dafoe et al. 2013; Hobson 2017),
on leaders (Debs and Goemans 2010; Saunders and Wolford 2018), on economic sanctions (Grau-
vogel et al. 2017; McLean and Radtke 2018), diplomacy (Saunders and Lebovic 2016), networks
(Kinne 2012). For instance, the democratic peace proposition argues that democracies do not fight
each other. According to our research, who is elected in a democracy can be, at least in part, a
function of the policies they propose toward powerful outsiders. This may provide another causal
mechanism for how the United States secures more pliant leaders among the world’s democracies
– and then has no need to fight them.
2 Why Intervene?
Scholars have long known that democratic elections matter, such contests have mostly been treated
as an independent variable. Research on elections as a dependent variable, i.e., something that
attracts international attention and action, has focused primarily on the role of external actors as
promoters of democracy. In pioneering work, Hyde (2011) has shown why and how states invite
external election observers. In many cases, a trade-off is seen between fighting for freedom and
fairness, and getting the right person to win the elections (Donno 2013; Kavakli and Kuhn 2019).2
A number of works have examined specifically the issue of taking sides: foreigners intervening
in a partisan manner in elections. Corstange and Marinov (2012) and Shulman and Bloom (2012)
show how voters evaluate partisan foreign interventions in their elections. Levin (2016) argues
that superpower support enabled targeted candidates to win during the Cold War. Tomz and Weeks
(2019) investigate how Americans would like to push back against hypothetical intervention sce-
narios in their elections. We extend further the insights from that work by asking what factors
provoke interventions. We focus on what we believe is an important factor: incumbent-opposition
policy divisions.
2Bush and Prather (2018) show that election observers may sometimes be seen as biased or agenda-driven. Knutsen
et al. (2017) explore the links between democracy and autocratic elections. Walter et al. (2018) demonstrate that
domestic referenda may be decided on the basis of expectations of how foreign powers would react.
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Hypotheses
We set up a very simple decision-theoretic model. Take an election in which two candidates pro-
pose policy platforms that may be different from the point of view of the outside power. We assume
the incumbent (A) and opposition (B) parties have policy platforms denoted by Agov and Bopp. An
incumbent’s vote-share can be represented as:
f (voter support, election bias) = f (χ,β )
We assume, in keeping with observed empirical regularities, that a more biased election (rigged
vote count, difficult registration, etc.) benefits the incumbent’s chances of reelection, whereas a
cleaner election benefits the opposition. We also assume that more votes for one party, benefits
that party and may lead to their victory. An incumbent wins, opposition loses, by a combination
of rigging the rules and garnering votes. Either may work by itself: and the success of one may
partly depend on the other (fewer votes may result in greater final tally under more biased rules).
We further assume that an intervener has two options: support candidates directly, by investing
resources in their campaign (e.g, promising aid if they win), or alter the rules under which an
election is held – by insisting on a cleaner election, or by tolerating repression of opposition ac-
tivists. We refer to the former as candidate or c investments, and to the latter as process or p
investments. The two distinct interventions change candidate support: χ(c), and the bias: β (p).
The post-intervention vote-share therefore becomes: f (χ(c),β (p)) = f (c, p)
We assume that the election result determines the policies according to the vote shares of the
platforms Agov and Bopp and that interventions are costly.3 Depending on the degree Γ to which
the outsider cares about the result of the election, the intervener’s utility will be:
u(c, p) = Γ( f (c, p) ·Agov+(1− f (c, p)) ·Bopp)− s(c, p)
The problem of intervention then becomes how much resources to invest in an election in order to
bring policies closer to the more desirable platform, given one’s preferences for the policies of one
candidate over the other.4
3We introduce a generic cost term s(c, p).
4 Here we assume away the presence of other interveners. The basic predictions of the model, which we derive in
Appendix A, are not affected.
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For a more compact statement, we define polarization as: pi = Agov−Bopp, such that intervener
prefers government to win when pi > 0 and the opposition to win if pi < 0. In our take, polarization
refers to the difference in the potential intervener’s utility for seeing (re-)elected the incumbent or
opposition. Then the outsiders’ choice is to pick c and p to maximize:
max
c,p
piΓ f (c, p)− s(c, p)
We assume that the supported candidate (with c) is more likely to win and that more bias means the
incumbent wins. If we further denote as c > 0 incumbent-supporting interventions (with c < 0, op-
position support), and with p> 0 pro-democracy or bias-reducing interventions (p< 0, democracy-
eroding, or bias-increasing ones),5 we can motivate the following predictions:
Hypothesis 1: Candidate interventions c are more likely if polarization pi is increasing.
Hypothesis 2: Process interventions p are less likely if polarization pi is increasing.
We formally derive these hypotheses for a suitable choice of functional forms in Appendix A.6
The first hypothesis simply says that if an outsider wants a candidate to win, they will invest in
that candidate’s vote share. The second hypothesis says that outsiders can also – in addition or
instead – invest in influencing the rules in a manner that favors their candidate. In different cases,
the mix of process and candidate interventions would vary depending on local conditions and
intervener preferences. What concerns us is the sign of slope of the investment in either strategy
over polarization, which we argue will hold.
What we would like to emphasize is that key to interventions is the difference between the gov-
ernment’s and the opposition’s policy positions. When the polarization parameter pi is set to 0,
interventions of either kind only generate costs and would not be undertaken.
We also note an additional implication of this model. We capture importance with the parameter
Γ. Policy divisions on more important issues (higher importance Γ) will attract interventions.
Higher Γ increases the (absolute value) of the predicted slope of interventions. The issue at stake
is expected to matter in motivating interveners to take interest in an election.
5We assume that f (c, p) is monotonously increasing in c and monotonously decreasing in p and that s(c, p) is
increasing in c and p.
6We think that rather than solving the decision-theoretic model for more general functional forms and with different
assumptions regarding the basic building blocks it would be a more promising area for future research to explicitly
model voter’s preferences regarding the two parties as well as their interaction with foreign interference.
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Our model can easily accommodate differences in the cost of intervention across countries. For
example, we would expect the cost of process interventions to be much higher in consolidated
democracies (and hence, they would be seldom undertaken). The reason is that working institu-
tions make it more difficult to affect how votes are counted, for instance. Note that candidate in-
terventions remain a possibility - voters in consolidated democracies and elsewhere can be swayed
by foreign campaign funds and similar measures.7
We assume that foreign help can boost the fortunes of a domestic ticket. As long as that works at
least sometimes, our model applies. We know that in many cases domestic actors ask for foreign
support and claim it is key for their success – for instance, in the case of Greek post-war elections
up until the 1967 military coup.8 If foreign powers assume that interventions will backfire, they
may refrain from undertaking them, or they may be more likely to intervene in a covert manner.
Notes on Polarization
We assume that polarization is about some pre-existing cleavages in society, such as Sunnis and
Shias in Lebanon seeing themselves aligned with America and Iran, respectively. Outside interven-
tions can exacerbate these divisions - by giving groups an additional reason to polarize (Corstange
and Marinov 2012). Groups may adopt a more or less extreme position in the expectation of for-
eign support. While the dynamics can be complicated, we still expect to find greater polarization
associated with greater propensity to intervene.
In our model, we assume that all cleavages and policies concerning the foreign power can me
mapped into a single one-dimensional policy space. The ideal point of the foreign power lies at
either end of this policy space. In a fractionalized political system, the intervener would support
the closest policy platform, taking into account its weight in a potential (coalition) government or
opposition platform (via Agov or Bopp).9
7A more sophisticated version of the model, allowing for endogenous policy positions, can be found in (Bubeck
and Marinov 2017).
8Wittner, Lawrence. 1982. American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949. New York, NY: Columbia University
Press.
9We abstract away from institutions and more complex time-lines. Cabinet-formation and coalition bargaining,
if introduced formally, will have non-trivial implications. Theoretically, a more fractionalized, parliamentary system
means an intervener has more options at the pre-election stage - but they also have that post-election, in terms of affect-
ing cabinet-formation. It is not possible to formulate an unambiguous expectation about how a PR (or Parliamentary
system) will make intervention more or less likely.
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The Role of Democratic Outside Power as a Driver of Interventions
So far, we assume that the intervener has no inherent preference for cleaner rules – and would
invest whatever maximizes the return on policy in light of the cost.
According to the model, even non-democracies would sometimes promote democratic elections:
in order to enhance the effectiveness of pro-candidate interventions. To give one example, in the
1945 Finnish election, the Soviet Union demanded that the Communists should be given more
freedom to campaign, and more access to the media. The Soviets based their demands on threats
to Finish post-war recovery and territorial integrity.10
We add an additional term to the maximization problem, giving the intervener an externality from




piΓ f (c, p)−λβ (p)− s(c, p)
The additional parameter λ > 0 captures the extent to which the foreign power cares about democ-
racy - more precisely, about the (non-negative) level of bias in the conduct of an election. Process
interventions may be justified either because a power cares about more or less democracy, under-
stood as cleaner elections, or (in addition or solely) because candidate interventions are enhanced
by or stymied by changing the rules the game. Another way to state this prediction is: in peri-
ods in which democracy matters more for states, we will see more pro-democracy interventions
undertaken.
We demonstrate next how a novel data collection helps to demonstrate the utility of this theoretical
exercise.
3 The Process-Party Dataset
We start by identifying all (potentially) competitive global elections over the period of 1945-2012,
using the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Mari-
nov 2012). We require that at least the following minimal conditions for political competition are
present: more than one candidate or party competes, and the incumbent’s office is subject to elec-
10Zilliacus, Kim O K. 1995. Finländsk kommunism i ljuset av väljarstöd 1945-1991. Bidrag till kännedom av
Finlands natur och folk, H. 149. Swedish ed. Helsingfors, Finland: Finska vetenskabs-societen.
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toral competition (these are variables available in NELDA).11 All regimes we study are ‘shades of
democracy’ - though some may be more on the authoritarian spectrum. We then take a stratified
random sample: for each country, we pick one Cold War and one post-Cold War election (the
period may be important for patterns of interventions). We rely on random selection to produce
results representative of the general relationship between polarization and interventions.
As a next step, for all elections in our sample, we predefine a list of powers that potentially have
a stake in the contest. We rely on the following selection criteria: all global/Great powers (veto-
yielding members of the UN) and regional powers, former colonial powers, immediate neighbors,
and regional political organizations. The selection of potential interveners is done regardless of
actual interventions. The full list is part of the online codebook. Each election has eight potential
interveners on average.
Our next objective is to use a variety of sources to generate data for each election on potential and
actual interveners, candidate interventions, process interventions, and the stances of the govern-
ment and the opposition toward the foreign intervener. We record policy stances of the local actors
in a manner that precedes and is independent of any actual intervention.
To find appropriate information, we asked research assistants to conduct targeted searches for each
election cycle of databases, such as LexisNexis, ProQuest, Google News, historical newspaper
archives, policy content generated by the actors themselves, and scholarly work related to a partic-
ular election in journals and books. This procedure ensured access to a variety of English-language
sources from around the world. In addition, the researchers processed French, German, and Span-
ish sources. The resulting articles are checked for appropriate information on interveners, policy
stances, and relations. Once we locate information, we save it and provide coding notes in order
to document the coding choices.12
Candidate interventions try to influence the number of votes cast for a particular candidate, often
but not necessarily within the legal framework of an electoral system. The following actions,
among others, count as candidate interventions: if a state or organization (1) makes benefits, such
as foreign aid, conditional on who wins, (2) threatens to pursue negative consequences (economic
sanctions, suspending diplomatic relations, military threat) in response to the ‘wrong’ winner, (3)
provides monetary or other benefits to a specific candidate or party, or (4) supports the election of
a specific candidate or party in statements. This includes public criticism of actual or proposed
policies if the criticism can be linked to support for the government or opposition at the ballot box.
11We follow Hyde and Marinov (2012) in this.
12We offer more information on the search procedure in online Appendix B. Also see
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The full set of allowed candidate codings are 1 for support for incumbent/government candidate;
0 if there is no support for any candidate; −1 for support for an opposition candidate. The inter-
mediate categories of 0.5 and −0.5 refer to actions that are less clear, or conflicting information is
present, with some evidence indicating support or opposition but other (less significant) evidences
contradicting that.
The most frequent type of candidate intervention in the dataset is public endorsements (32 per-
cent). A full 25 percent of candidate intervention qualify as providing support for a party, such
as campaign funds or propaganda. Promises of economic rewards or club membership (e.g., in
the European Union) that are tied to a candidate make up 16 percent of candidate interventions.
Only about one percent of candidate interventions are candidate-specific military threats or acts of
violence. Most interventions include more than one action: linking aid to a candidate’s election,
and joint campaign appearances with the U.S. Ambassador, for example.
Process interventions capture whether a foreign powers sought to enhance (+1), weaken (−1),
or did not exert an effect (0), on the electoral process. Values of 0.5 and −0.5 are allowed for
less clear (mixed) interventions, with one type dominating. Some examples of a positive process
intervention include a state or organization: (a) sending or supporting credible election monitors
to testify about the fairness of an election, (b) attempting to even the playing field in accordance
with national electoral laws and internationally-accepted standards, (c) ensuring orderly and free
and fair elections by providing security for voters, or (d) threatening consequences if fraud occurs,
such as economic sanctions or freezing aid. By contrast, a negative process intervention obtains if
a state or organization: (i) tries to legitimize an election process that is clearly corrupt, (ii) helps
governments to change voting rules in a way that distorts the playing field, (iii) endangers orderly
and free and fair elections by approving or assisting in violence against voters or a political group,
or (iv) provides benefits to governments that orchestrated electoral fraud.
Again, noting that most interventions feature more than one element, the predominant patterns
are: praising polls with widely-recognized shortcomings (31 percent) is the most frequent type of
negative intervention, followed by playing down evidence of bad play (23 percent), and actively
supplanting democratic institutions, which occurred in 11.4 percent of all negative process inter-
ventions. As far as positive interventions are concerned, the following predominate: observing
elections (35.3 percent), providing positive reports and rewards for clean elections (31.3 percent),
providing negative reports and punishments for flawed elections (22.3 percent), and providing aid,
security or logistics for the electoral process (12.7 percent).
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All actions coded in either the candidate or process support variables concern only the pre-electoral
period. We seek to avoid judgement about the effectiveness of different intervention strategies, so
we merely record whether an intervention of any kind has occurred.13
According to the argument we make, policy polarization accounts for the decisions of outsiders to
intervene in an election. Variables Agov and Bopp capture the orientation of the government and
opposition toward the intervening power. More precisely, this is the stance of the relevant actor on
the policy issues a foreign power cares about when it comes to that country. Government is defined
as the political party or parties and/or leader in office at the time when the election takes place.14
Opposition is defined as the opposition party or parties in parliament, their front-runners, and/or
new parties or candidates attracting a substantial amount of public support.
Agov and Bopp range from friendly (+1) to neither friendly, nor unfriendly (0) to unfriendly (−1).
Intermediate values of 0.5 and −0.5 are allowed for where we uncover mixed messages on rela-
tions with the foreign power, with one direction predominating. While we consider and document
stances on all issues of concern to the outside power in an election, the orientation coding is a sin-
gle numeric value reflecting the human coder’s judgment on the overall stance of the actor toward
the intervening power. If there are more than one government or opposition parties, the coding
takes the strength of each party in previous elections or in the pre-election polls into account.15
Again, we clarify that we focus on the pre-election period: no information from the period after the
election enters coding decisions. Information from scholarly books and articles are only considered
if they pertain to the pre-election period. The publication date of scholarly books or articles do not
need to be before the election date, but the information provided by these sources has to be on the
pre-election period. If we were unable to identify whether they apply to the pre-election period,
they were not considered for the coding decisions.
The measurement for polarization pi is based on the difference between Agov and Bopp. Conse-
quently, pi ranges, in increments of 0.5, from +2 (friendly government, unfriendly opposition) to
−2 (unfriendly incumbent, friendly opposition).16
Table 1 shows the coding scheme at work in nine elections. The data collection takes as a starting
point the NELDA dataset (columns one and two). Columns three to seven come from our new cod-
13Our scheme and documentation enables researchers to turn plausible conjectures about the seriousness or effec-
tiveness of different kinds of interventions into testable hypotheses.
14If the government has been in office very briefly as in the case of a caretaker government, we consider the previous
administration as Agov for the coding.
15For instance, a major opposition party with a friendly stance of +1 and a minor opposition party with an unfriendly
stance of -1 would result in a coding of Bopp of +0.5.
16In the situation of an unknown and irrelevant opposition coded as 77, polarization becomes 0 because the opposi-
tion is unable or unwilling to formulate a foreign policy position that is independent from the government’s stance.
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Table 1: Illustrative Codings
Country Election ID Intervener Agov Bopp Process Candidate
Guatemala 600-2007-0907-L1 United States −0.5 77 0 0
El Salvador 092-2006-0312-L1 United States 1 0 1 0
Guyana 110-1985-1209-L1 United States 0 −1 0 0
Peru 135-1945-0610-L1 United States 1 1 0 0
Uruguay 165-2004-1031-L1 Brazil 0 1 0 −1
Italy 325-1979-0603-L1 USSR/Russia 0 0.5 0 0
Moldova 359-1996-1117-P2 USSR/Russia −1 1 0 0
ing. The Brazil-as-intervener case in the Uruguayan 2004 legislative election (165-2004-1031-L1)
says that the governing party in Uruguay had neither friendly nor unfriendly attitude toward Brazil
(0), the opposition parties had a friendly stance toward Brazil. According to the last two columns,
Brazil supported the opposition with candidate-targeting election intervention but refrained from
seeking to affect the rules of the game.
We implemented a procedure of documenting the grounds for each decision. There are case studies
for each intervener in each election, in which information from the original sources is saved. We
annotated the case-studies in a manner allowing us to use text-analysis tools, developed in the
field of Natural Language Processing (NLP). We highlight with pre-defined ‘keys’, the pieces of
text in original source that justify a specific coding of a variable. We implement the highlights
as a custom-created simple mark-up language in LATEX. The mark-up is rendered as colors in the
resulting PDF file. The choice of colors is arbitrary and is for coder- and reader-convenience only.
Consider the example of the 1945 Peruvian legislative election (135-1945-0610-L1), shown in
Table 1. In the Presidential election of that year, Jose Bustamante y Rivero of the coalition National
Democratic Front (FDN) was elected as new President, receiving 66 per cent of the vote. General
Eloy G. Ureta of the Revolutionary Union coalition received 33 per cent. Due to a constitutional
provision, incumbent President Manuel Prado Ugarteche did not seek re-election. In the legislative
election, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), which was part of the FDN, won
an absolute majority. The following annotated notes support the positive decisions on variables
Agov and Bopp with respect to the main actors’ stances on relations/issues of concern with the
United States:
The Second World War also brought APRA closer to the Allies than to the Axis, and Luis Alberto
Sanchez, a leading aprista, argued that it was Haya’s anti-Axis, pro-Roosevelt position that led to
the establishment of relations between U.S. Ambassador John Campbell White and APRA in late
1944 and early 1945. It should be added that APRA‘s strategists looked to the United States to
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provide the foreign capital that would be needed to initiate economic growth in the postwar era. On
the eve of the 1945 elections, the U.S. embassy believed that ‘little doubt remained that victory for
Dr. Bustamante spells government in Peru by APRA. The United States continued, however, to be
reassured by APRA’s evident popular power, its avowed commitment to democracy and inter-Amer-
ican cooperation, and its explicit anticommunism. (p. 177 in: Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough
(eds.): Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War. Cambridge University
Press, 1992)
As expected, Prado y Ugarteche maintained the pro-oligarchy policies in a very explicit manner
between 1939 and 1945, year marked by World War 2. He also repaired Peru‘s relationships with the
Allies, immediately breaking relations with the fascist countries. He signed loan-lease treatises with
the United States and permitted the construction of an American base at the oil port of Talara. He also
deported thousands of Japanese residents after confiscating their properties. He accepted the Ameri-
can wish to establish a policy of price stability of domestic raw materials in exchange for a US tariff
reduction. As Julio Cotler noted, ‘Peru suddenly became the guardian and defender of Roosevelt’s
four freedoms, hoping to be repaid for its unconditional support of North American policies.’ Thanks
to its political leaders, Peru was converted into a good neighbor, the kind that US President Franklin
Roosevelt wanted.” (Henry Tantalean: Peruvian Archaeology: A Critical History. Routledge, 2016)
Both the governing (light red underline) and opposition party (light blue underline) candidates
promoted cooperation to the United States and took a friendly stance toward their neighbor to the
North. Whether on military, ideological matters, or other matters, the main contenders for power
had no disagreement with the United States. Thus, this is a case of no (0) polarization.
In addition to transparency, this type of documentation offers other advantages. We note some of
these next.
Automatic Identification of Directionality
We want to know whether a machine learning algorithm would be able to produce numeric values
from the saved, annotated notes that are similar to the ones our human coders provide. In particular,
we want to know whether ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ directions in government and opposition clas-
sifications are so consistently coded that an algorithm would learn to precisely distinguish them.
To that end, we retrieve all snippets with their related code. In this setting, each highlighted piece
of text is associated with a binary label (− or +), referring to negative stance toward the foreign
country or a positive overall stance.
We employ a Support Vector Machine (SVM), a very popular supervised-learning model for clas-
sification, adopted both in NLP research (Joachims 1998) and by the text-as-data community
(D’Orazio et al. 2014; Merz et al. 2016).
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It is crucial for supervised learning approaches to provide training examples; pieces of text that fit
a certain description, and others that do not. The SVM classifier, in particular, uses the example to
map the text as points in a multi-dimensional space. Subsequently, it finds the vector that separates
points belonging to the two classes (in our case, these are highlighted strings that point to negative
stances and to positive stances by government or opposition). Then, when the SVM is provided
with a new snippet of text that needs to be classified, it maps it again into that same space and
predicts the class, based on the position of the point with respect to the separating vector. Based
on the distance of the point to the vector, the SVM is also able to provide us with the level of
confidence of the prediction.
We test the SVM in a 10-fold cross-validation setting (see Manning et al. 1999) in comparison with
a different classification algorithm, a Naive Bayes (NB) classifier. For each, we experiment both
with term-frequency (TF-IDF) and semantic (w-emb) vector representations of texts.17 We are
able to achieve good performance with the different classifiers, up to an accuracy of 80% with the
SVM employing word embeddings, which means that the property under study is better captured
when modelling the underlying semantics and not just the frequency of words.18
Using this algorithm in a cross-validation setting, we have produced machine-generated predictions
for all highlighted texts in our collection.19 Moreover, the SVM classifier give also the opportunity
of moving beyond the binary label provided for each highlighted text. In order to obtain a contin-
uous value, ranging between -1 (highly negative) to 1 (highly positive), we employ the confidence
score of each decision and consequently re-scale each prediction.
This provides us with a new version of the dataset, in which human numeric decisions (-1,-
0.5,0,0.5,1) are replaced by a machine-generated continuous value. The continuity in the mea-
surement reflects the computer learning from the general direction assigned by the human coder,
extrapolating, and assigning some uncertainty to its decision. This gives us an alternative measure-
ment of polarization, which we use to check the robustness of our results.
17We have experimented with two different ways of providing snippets to the classifier in the form of numerical
vectors (the type of input required by the algorithm to map them as points in space): a) the first was to represent
them as term frequency–inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) vectors, which capture word-frequency information
(Manning et al. 2008); b) the second as averaged word embeddings (w-emb) (Mikolov et al. 2013), which are vectors
that capture semantic properties of texts, such as addressing the same topic even when using different words. While
word frequency vectors have been largely adopted in text-based political science research (Hillard et al. 2008; D’Orazio
et al. 2014; Merz et al. 2016), word embeddings, due to their novelty, have been only recently employed, in particular
for ideological positioning (Rheault and Cochrane 2019; Nanni et al. 2019). Choosing between the two representations
largely depends on whether the information that the classifier is aimed to capture is mentioned explicitly or is conveyed
in a more implicit way.
18In particular, when the confidence of the classifier is above 80% its precision reaches over 90%.
19This has been done in 10 different experiments, changing every time the 90% of examples used as training data
and the 10% used as test, on which we obtained the predictions and related confidence scores.
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Automatic Identification of Policy Issues at Stake
International relations tends to divide issues of concern in relations between states into broadly
economic and military/political ones. Scholars seem to think that military-related issues of security
tend to dominate – since they pertain to survival (Gilpin 1987).
We may want to know, for instance, whether the discussion of relations between Bolivia and the
United States centers on debt restructuring, armed conflict, or drug production. A Bolivian politi-
cian may promise to eradicate drugs (a positive development from a US point of view), or may
promise the opposite (a negative development). For convenience, we refer to the stances as posi-
tive or negative (directionality discussion in previous section), and to the policy issues as the policy
issues at stake in an election. A policy issue may be salient, but it may not generate divisions – if
all main political actors may be in agreement on what needs to be done.
Based on the information uncovered, the principal investigators created six categories of policy
issues of interest:
i. Issues of alignment capture spheres of influence (Communist vs Western), inclusion in broad
geographical and cultural groupings (Middle-East, Caspian), former colonial empires, mem-
bership in alliances, including hosting of bases, and membership in regional blocs (this is
a broad category related most centrally to security, but also to a ‘civilizational’ choices or
groupings).
ii. Issues of armed conflict capture strife, use of force, troop deployment, violence, border
clashes, rebel activity. Disputes over territory and nuclear weapons enter here.
iii. Economic issues include investment, trade, aid, energy, health, reconstruction, logistics such
as roads and ports.
iv. Democracy and human rights issues include freedoms, repression, elections, persecution of
minorities, migration.
v. Left-right issues reflect the use of left-right language.
vi. Global bads capture corruption, transnational crime, terrorism and similar.
We created a dictionary of terms (online Appendix D) around those issues and used text analysis
techniques to classify their presence in each intervener-targeted-election pair, essentially checking
all the highlighted text on which Agov and Bopp decisions are made. To do so, we build a semantic
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representation of each issue (i.e., a centroid), as the average of the word-embeddings of all its seed
words (Manning et al. 2008). Then, given the semantic representation of a snippet, we measured
the relevance to it of each issue as the cosine similarity between the two vectors (representing the
snippet and the issue).20 The relevance score reflects how much discussion of stances of govern-
ment and opposition on policies of interest to an outsider matches each of the policy stakes we
created.
One way we can think about the semantic match as the relative weight of the issue in the resulting
numeric score. A higher match indicates that more discussion is dominated by a particular issue,
leading to the expectation that this issue is relatively more important or influential in setting the
overall tone in relations. For each election, and potential intervening power, we rank-ordered the
different categories by the degree they match: creating ‘a most important’ issue, and ending with
a ‘least important’, or least matching, issue. This is equivalent to saying that one issue has the
highest congruence, followed by the issue with the next-highest congruence, and concluding with
the issue that is least congruent.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of issues at stake for interveners for each of the different elec-
tions in our data. Six histograms show the importance of alignment, armed conflict, economic
items, democracy and human rights, left-right issues, and global bads such as terrorism and drug-
trafficking. Each panel overlays two histograms in the interest of space. Results confirm that issues
of political alignment and security are dominant themes when candidates discuss relations with a
specific external power. Economic matters come in third place. Democracy and human rights is-
sues are of intermediate concern. Left-right divisions and terrorism do not make it to the top of the
agenda for most cases.21
Improvements Over Other Data Sets
The data on political polarization we provide is an advance over the available alternatives. The
CMP is a well-known and highly-respected effort to assemble a large dataset of what each party
said it would do, in written form, before an election was conducted (Budge et al. 2001).22 Human
interpretative coders estimate a variety of position placements for all major political parties based
on 56 policy categories, which are extracted from the parties’ electoral programs. In addition,
20Figure D.3 in online Appendix D.1 shows the obtained centroids.
21That these are the dominant issues is not to say that these issues explain divisions between the candidates. Indeed,
whether domestic candidates are more likely to disagree on matters related to alignment but agree on matters related
to economics is a separate, interesting issue we do not pursue here.
22https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/.
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Figure 1: Policy issue at stake in relations between intervening power and target country: text-
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scholars have used the manifesto corpus to create alternative policy categorizations and to auto-
matically scale positions based on text. While the dataset is impressive and an excellent resource
for many research agendas, its utility for studying election interventions is limited. First, CMP
historically has focused on about fifty, mostly developed, countries. CMP also does not cover all
potential issues that may drive country’s relationships with foreign powers. There are some vari-
ables related to internationalism, peacefulness, and left-right divisions. These may be salient for
foreign powers. We pick the left-right dimension available from CMP for a comparison to our data
as a predictor of interventions. It may be somewhat important in itself, or as a proxy for other
dimensions.
UN voting alignment data is also a plausible alternative dataset. UNGA has received much at-
tention in the literature (Márin-Bosch 1987; Voeten 2012) and constitutes the most widely used
measurement of countries’ foreign policy preferences (Bailey et al. 2017a). Given the broad range
of topics that are voted on every year and the fact that the large majority of countries are part of
the UNGA (Chelotti et al. 2019), scholars have been interested in using the expressed preferences
from states’ voting behavior — and the resulting voting similarities — as an indicator for state rela-
tionships that are comparable across time and space (Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2012). While
measures for extracting policy preferences and constructing relationship structures are abundant
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and range from simple (see Voeten 2012, for an overview) to more complex (Magu and Mateos
2018), recent studies question whether any of these measures can actually capture the underlying
preferences of states.23 For us, the concern is that issues that are up for a vote at the UN may not
correlate with the set of issues at stake in relations between two countries. Furthermore, UN voting
is available only for the government, thus ignoring the position of the opposition. Nonetheless, in
what follows, we use voting similarity on the UNGA votes (in the year before election) to check
whether it predicts U.S. election interventions. We focus on all, rather than only important votes
because these are shown to be highly correlated for most significant purposes.24
Next, we use these datasets to estimate a model of US interventions in the elections of other coun-
tries. Online Appendixes H and I provide a detailed look at how the UN and CMP measurements
relate to our Process-Party measurement of polarization for the case of the United States as inter-
vener.
4 When Does the US Intervene in Elections?
Historically, the US has been the most active power undertaking interventions, possibly because
it is a powerful country and a democracy (thus, familiar with how elections operate). We use US
interventions to illustrate the importance of our theoretical point and empirical measures.
Figure 2 and Table 2 show the linear fit of an OLS model for candidate and process interventions
undertaken by the United States against polarization as measured by the Process-Party data.25 Po-
larization is defined as the difference between two−1 to 1 measures, Agov and Bopp and so it ranges
from −2 to 2. It also shows the same by CMP (left-right split) and against the target government’s
voting alignment in the UNGA. The UNGA data is the government’s voting alignment, normalized
and rescaled so that the minimum in the sample is −2 and maximum is 2, essentially setting the
opposition’s unobserved alignment to 0. We are forced to do that since no opposition measure is
23At the heart of this debate is the question whether countries are free in casting their votes, due to findings of
external influences on UNGA voting in the form of foreign aid and vote-buying (Wang 1999; Dreher et al. 2008;
Carter and Stone 2016; Bailey et al. 2017a), voting blocs (Lijphart 1963; Kim and Russett 1996), or to what extent
voting similarity occurs either only through changes in the resolution (Brazys and Panke 2017) or simply by chance
(Häge 2011; Häge and Hug 2013). Current debates on UNGA voting reflect these problems and discuss to what extent
voting at the UNGA represents a valid indicator of policy preferences of if other sources are more appropriate (Chelotti
et al. 2019).
24Bailey et al. (2017b, 441) notes, when comparing votes on important vs not-important resolutions: “The broad
patterns are the same, but minor differences do exist and these may be the more appropriate measures for some
analyses. The bivariate correlation between ideal points estimated based on important votes and all votes is .92.”
25The linear model fit is based on the values {−1,−0.5,0,0.5,1} for p and c from the Process-Party data as outlined
in section 3. In Figure 2 the label d+ on the y-axis represents p = 1 and g+ represents c = 1 in order to improve the
readability of the combined figure.
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available. Accoring to section 2, we expect an upward slope (β1 > 0) for candidate interventions
and a downward slope (β1 < 0) for process interventions.
Figure 2: US Process and Candidate Interventions: OLS on Process-Party data, UNGA voting
alignment, L-R polarization from CMP.
pro-democracy interventions are denoted by d+, negative values denote actions that are under-
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The Process-Party dataset bears the predictions of the theoretical model, expecting upward-sloping
candidate-interventions and downward-sloping process interventions over policy polarization.26
When the US wants the government to win (positive and high polarization), it does not promote
democracy, and it puts resources behind the governing candidate ticket. When the opposition
26We list-wise delete missing opposition/government scores (since polarization is not available). This concerns one
tenth of cases. If we set the missing score to 0, results are not significantly altered.
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is preferred, democracy-promotion is undertaken to the fullest, and these are backed by or ac-
companied by attempts to boost the opposition ticket via candidate support. Interestingly, some
democracy-support is forthcoming even when the US has no reason to prefer one set of candidates
over another (policy polarization of pi = 0), suggesting that part of the attraction of this strategy
lies with the inherent appeal of promoting democracy abroad. The confidence intervals are narrow,
reflecting both precise measures and the larger sample size. Data is available for all elections in
the Process-Party dataset. While sometimes the two distinct types of interventions are undertaken
separately, in many cases, the US engages in both simultaneously, suggesting that there are com-
plementarities. We could acccount for this via a joint estimation of both outcome variables via
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). We find that standard errors only change by a tiny amount
and that this does not affect the overall significance patterns (cf. online app. Table F.8).
Table 2: US Process and Candidate Interventions: OLS on Process-Party data, UNGA voting
alignment, L-R polarization from CMP.
Process/Candidate Interventionsi = β0+β1 ·Divisionsi+ εi.
Process Interventions Candidate Interventions
Polarization -0.134*** 0.190***
(0.0341) (0.0286)
UNGA alignment -0.336*** 0.0696
(0.0669) (0.0581)
Left-Right (CMP) -0.0116 0.176**
(0.0323) (0.0842)
Constant 0.230*** 0.196*** 0.0593* 0.00302 0.0568*** 0.0682*
(0.0300) (0.0265) (0.0301) (0.0172) (0.0193) (0.0392)
Observations 232 221 58 232 221 58
R-squared 0.082 0.107 0.001 0.304 0.010 0.085
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
By contrast, in the CMP and UNGA linear fits, the confidence intervals are wider. In the UNGA
model, the slope of candidate interventions is indistinguishable from 0 (suggesting that government
alignment does not predict efforts to boost a particular candidate). In the CMP model, the slope
of pro-democracy interventions is not distinct from 0, suggesting that left-right divisions are not
predictive of an intervening power’s commitment to clean rules of the game.
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UNGA voting alignment is likely a noisy proxy for the issues at stake in an election. The process-
party data does not measure solely, or most importantly, foreign-policy positions. An outsider
may be concerned primarily about domestic issues from the target’s perspective: drug production,
investment policy, human rights abuses. These policies may or may not overlap with the UN’s
agenda. In addition, voting-alignment similarity is based on observed votes: since many items
never come up for a vote, the resulting measure may not reflect states’ true conflicts and similari-
ties. India-Pakistan and Greece-Turkey had nearly perfect voting alignment while fighting wars or
being on the brink of a war. In addition, the missing opposition position variable in UNGA data
may bias the coefficients away from their true slope.27
We believe our measurement to be an independent source of information that is better suited for
studying election interventions. UN alignment may be better for other purposes.
The CMP measurement of polarization does not track closely enough the issues over which inter-
ventions occur. This may help explain the wide confidence interval on candidate interventions.28
Still, the slope is similar to the one we estimate with the Process-Party data, possibly a reflection of
the tendency of the left-right dimension to track anti-Americanism in the West (Chiozza 2009) and
other issues of interest to the US. In addition, since process-altering interventions may be impracti-
cal or impossible in the mostly consolidated democracies covered by CMP, it is not surprising that
left-right divisions are not predictive of the US decision to promote more or less clean elections.
Even though we create c and p interventions in a manner independent of the polarization vari-
able, one may want to see whether results hold with some extraneously-generated measurement
of interventions. For this purpose, we generate one additional measurement of US democratic
interventions abroad. We extract the number of times a country’s election is criticized in the Con-
gressional record, for the 1988 to 2016 period.29 We replicate the democracy-promotion top part of
Table 2 with the new measurement in online Appendix Table G.11. The Process-Party polarization
measurement predicts greater criticism of elections when opposition has friendlier stance. Neither
UNGA’s alignment nor CMP’s left-right measurements produce similar effects.
Covert interventions are partly captured by our dataset but may be partly missed. We discuss how
that influences our empirical predictions in Appendix C. We may be underestimating the true effect
of divisions on interventions, making this a hard test for the theory.
27In online Appendix C we show how omitting the opposition’s position may bias the results when predicting
election interventions.
28The Process-Party model (on the left) yields a better fit even if restricted only to the observations for which CMP
has non-missing data, suggesting that this is not due to sample-selection.
29We use a dictionary of terms related to elections, to country’s name, and critical terms. Full documentation can
be supplied on request.
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Logit Models of US Interventions with Process Party Measures
While OLS provides for an easy comparison, our variables may not comply with the types of
scaling assumptions needed to run an OLS. Policy divisions in Sweden may differ from those in
Iran, pro-democracy interventions may require a different threshold than non-democracy ones, and
so on. The addition of standard covariates may help us establish the robustness of the relationship.
The main relationship between process and candidate interventions and polarization also holds
in an ordered logit model (see columns 1 and 4 of Table 4), and even when we recode process
and candidate interventions as dummy variables and use a conventional logit model to check for a
relationship (see columns 2,3,5 and 6 of Table 4).
We also add controls: a dummy variable to indicate whether a target country is developed, a
dummy variable measuring whether a target country is a democracy based on the V-Dem polyarchy
electoral democracy measurement (Coppedge et al. 2016), and a Post-Cold War dummy variable.30
Table 3 shows summary statistics for our main dataset covering US interventions.
The basic results still hold. As expected there seem to be fewer interventions in more democratic
countries, regardless of the level of polarization. This means that democratic consolidation makes
democracy-promotion unnecessary, and democracy-erosion costly and impractical. Foreign pow-
ers are less likely to engage in pro-democracy interventions if they prefer the government. Higher
values of the polarization variable predict a lower probability Pr(d+), so democracy enhancing
interventions are less frequent. The evidence on democracy-erosion Pr(d−) as a function of po-
larization is weaker.
Polarization remains a robust predictor of candidate interventions. The polarization variable takes
values between −2 and +2, and its standard deviation is approximately 0.9. A logit coefficient
for polarization of 2.394 in column 2 of Table 4 translates31 into an almost 10-fold increase in the
odds of a candidate intervention benefiting the government if polarization increases by one unit.
Similarly, if polarization increases by one unit, the odds of a process intervention that enhances
democracy are reduced32 by around 42%.
We also run specifications that control for various regions of the world via dummy variables (see
Table F.9 in the online Appendix). The coefficient of our ordered logit models remain similar.
30Development set to 1 for above the global median in period in World Bank data, v-Dem electoral democracy
above .6 set for democracy, and post-1990 is end of Cold War. Results do not depend on these specific cut-offs.
31We need to calculate the increase in the odds ratio as e2.394−1= 9.96 and can compare it to the odds of a candidate
intervention benefiting the government if all variables (including polarization) are set to 0, i.e. e−4.245 = 0.014, which
translates in a probability of around 0.014, i.e. odds ratio = p/(1− p).
32We need to calculate the decrease in the odds ratio as e−0.550−1 =−0.42
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Table 3: Summary Table for US Interventions
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Process Interventions 261 0.195 0.425 -1 1
Candidate Interventions 261 0.0556 0.307 -1 1
V-Dem Polyarchy 252 0.528 0.251 0.0859 0.958
UNGA Voting Alignment 222 -0.00390 0.413 -0.797 0.992
Developed Country 251 0.602 0.491 0 1
Polarization (Process Party) 232 0.267 0.916 -2 2
Note: This table shows summary statistics for US interventions. A single observation is an election
in a certain country that was selected for our random sample of elections.
There is no region of the world in which candidate interventions are significantly more likely to
happen relative to advanced economies (ADV); the coefficient for process interventions is pos-
itive and significant at the 5%-level for Latin America (LA) relative to ADV. Once we look at
the dichotomous outcomes Pr(g+), Pr(g−), Pr(d+) and Pr(d−) we find similar coefficients for
polarization, but some interesting regularities affect the number of observations and the extent
to which these estimations are comparable to the previous estimations. There were no candidate
interventions benefiting the opposition ticket in African countries (reducing the number of obser-
vations to 159 in the respective estimation). At the same time there were no process interventions
in advanced economies (reducing the observation count to 166 for both models).33
Additionally, we present evidence based on an alternative variable for candidate divisions extracted
from the Process-Party dataset. We create one dummy variable to indicate if the foreign power
prefers the opposition and one if it prefers the government to win. This approach places the fewest
assumptions on how much the foreign intervener prefers the opposition over the government, when
it comes to predicting involvement. Table F.10 in the online Appendix shows the result of these
logit models, with dummy variables both as regressors and as outcome variables. The basic intu-
ition we have previously presented still holds.
Issues at Stake
We show in Appendix E results on the importance of issues. We expect higher stakes to result in
steeper slope for interventions. We divide the sample into cases where alignment or armed conflict
33We choose post-communist countries as the reference category for these estimations and find no regional category
that significantly differs from it.
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Table 4: Logit Models of Interventions with Process-Party Polarization
Candidate Interventions Process Interventions
Ordered Pr(g+) Pr(g−) Ordered Pr(d+) Pr(d−)
Polarization 2.225*** 2.394*** -1.940*** -0.669*** -0.550** 0.845
(0.296) (0.363) (0.555) (0.230) (0.216) (0.703)
Developed Country 0.591 0.401 -0.386 -0.879** -0.884** 0.583
(0.509) (0.661) (0.704) (0.384) (0.427) (0.692)
V-Dem Polyarchy -0.408 -0.0737 0.00780 -1.056 -2.795*** -7.805***
(0.687) (1.206) (1.734) (0.743) (0.847) (2.261)
Post Cold War -0.375 -0.166 0.669 1.273*** 1.945*** 1.043
(0.474) (0.686) (0.786) (0.381) (0.521) (0.744)
Constant -4.245*** -4.060*** -0.358 -1.510
(0.840) (1.451) (0.440) (1.526)
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: US process interventions (d+ pro-democracy interventions are indicated by positive values
of the outcome variable, d− negative values denote actions that are undermining democracy),
and US candidate interventions (positive values indicate pro-government interventions g+). We
estimate:
Process/Candidate Interventionsi = β0+β1 ·Polarizationi+ γ ·Controlsi+ εi.
Process/Candidate interventions take the values −1, −0.5, 0, 0.5 and 1. For candidate interven-
tions we estimate an ordered logit model and binomial logit models on dummies that take a value
of 1 if c > 0 denoted by g+ (and accordingly g− for c < 0). For process interventions we repeat
this approach and estimate again an ordered logit as well as binomial models using dummies for
d+ (pro-democracy interventions with p > 0) and d− (for p < 0).
are the first or second-most important issues, and cases where economic issues, left-right divisions,
democracy, global bads assume this ranking. We expect the first group to feature higher stakes (Γ).
Figures E.4 and Table E.7 in the online appendix show the results. We do, indeed, find a steeper
slope for what we call higher-stakes issues. However, in a fully-interactive model, the interaction
term between stakes and polarization (not shown), is not significant. Thus, we have suggestive, but
not statistically-significant evidence that higher policy stakes drive US interventions.
A Look at All Interveners
Figure 3 and Table 5 present OLS results for all interveners globally in the elections we study, for
both the Cold War and post-Cold War period. Results remain unchanged for the whole sample, with
some interesting regularities observed by period (ordered logit yields similar results. Polarization
seems to be more strongly driven by policy divisions during the Cold War, possibly a reflection
of the higher stakes inherent in Super Power competition. Process interventions are only weakly
predicted by polarization during the Cold War, but become much more strongly predicted in the
more current period. It is possible that some substitution is at work, with states switching to the
more acceptable form of election intervention - affecting democratic processes - after the end of
the Cold War. Also, the overall emphasis on democracy-promotion (at 0 polarization) is higher
after 1990 - a reflection of the growing international concern with clean elections. The latter is
evidence consistent with the additional democracy term we introduced in the model. The upward
move is statistically significant, suggesting a greater λ in the post-Cold War period.
It is also the case, though we do not show it here, that the US is more committed to promoting
cleaner processes - when compared to any other intervener.
We also use this set-up for two extra robustness checks. Online Appendix F, Figure F.6 shows what
happens when we replace the human coding of polarization, with machine-predicted scores. We
see more noise, wider confidence-interval, but direction and significance is unaltered.
We evaluate in online Appendix F, Figure F.7 whether elections in which the incumbent’s office
is contested (a presidential election in a presidential system or any parliamentary election in a
parliamentary system) have higher stakes for interveners and elicit more activity. There is some
evidence to this effect, but it is not very strong. All national-level elections seem to attract foreign
interest, possibly because they all matter.
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Table 5: Interventions by All Powers
Process Interventions Candidate Interventions
All Cold War Post CW All Cold War Post CW
Polarization -0.0424** -0.0335 -0.0550** 0.169*** 0.201*** 0.140***
(0.0194) (0.0249) (0.0266) (0.0240) (0.0395) (0.0253)
Constant 0.0736*** -0.00450 0.117*** -0.00598 -0.00721 -0.00348
(0.0105) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.00672) (0.0125) (0.00752)
Observations 1,667 585 1,082 1,668 586 1,082
R-squared 0.010 0.017 0.011 0.240 0.299 0.188
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Process/Candidate Interventionsi = β0+β1 ·Polarizationi+ εi.
Does it Matter? Pre-election Positions, Post-election Policies
Does polarization matter? It could be that our measurement is a poor representation of policy
positions, or that, whoever is elected adapts their position, rendering their pre-election positions
irrelevant. The latter may be especially the case for more democratic states, in which incumbents
have an incentive to preempt opposition challenges through moderation.
We take advantage of two NELDA-provided variables to evaluate this possibility. We combine
questions nelda51 (“Is there a negative change in relations with the US after the election?”) and
nelda52 (“Is there a positive change in relations with the US after the election?”) in a new binary
variable which is 1 for cases in which there was any change in relations with US after the election.34
We also take the absolute value of polarization as an independent variable. We, again, divide the
sample into democracies based on the V-Dem polyarchy electoral democracy measurement. A
score of greater than .6 is defined as a democracy (choice of threshold does not matter).
We run a logit model of a post-election policy change in relations with the US as a function of
pre-election polarization in Table 6. We find that growing polarization is associated with change in
relations, regardless of regime type. It is also the case that absolute polarization is somewhat lower
(0.57) in democracies than non-democracies (0.72). Thus, there is some moderation in democra-
cies – but, conditional on polarization, there is policy change in relations with US across regime
types. While this discovery calls for separate explanation, we take these findings as additional
validation of the polarization variable we construct, and for our general approach.
Table 6: Ex-ante Polarization (Process Party) and Ex-post Change in Relations with US (Nelda)
by whether State is Democracy or not (V-Dem).
Abs. Change in Relations with US
in Dem=0 in Dem=1





Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.075
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
34NELDA does not distinguish this variable further, but the variable appears to track at least in part the removal or
imposition of economic sanctions).
26
5 Conclusion
Election interventions are here to stay. In this piece, we advance our current understanding of
interventions by distinguishing between two types: a process intervention, designed to strengthen
or weaken the rules of the game, and a candidate intervention - with the goal to increase the
support for a specific candidate. We argue that policy divisions in target countries are important
determinants of intervention. If foreign powers prefer the government, they are more likely to
weaken the democratic process and/or providing direct support for the government. By contrast,
if foreign powers want to see an opposition victory, they would strengthen the democratic process
and/or try to directly intervene to increase the opposition’s electoral performance. This should be
particularly the case if an election is of great importance for a foreign power, while pro-democratic
interventions become more likely in periods in which foreign powers have a stronger commitment
to democracy.
In order to test the propositions we derive from the argument, we select a random sample of elec-
tions held globally between 1945 and 2012. We design a coding scheme and rely on high-quality
human coding to create a measurement of political polarization between government and oppo-
sition candidates in elections. We also develop a measurement of how foreign powers sought to
affect the process of holding free and fair elections and the election odds of the incumbent and the
opposition. We show that our Party-Process dataset has advantages over alternative datasets, such
as the UNGA or the CMP.
Based on our original dataset, we show in OLS regression analyses that the United States is more
likely to promote democracy if the opposition is pro-American while the government is not. The
US is also more likely to directly support a pro-American incumbent or opposition candidate if
the other domestic side does not share these positions. The evidence on elections of higher impor-
tance resulting in steeper slopes of interventions is weaker. Globally, pro-democratic interventions
become generally more prevalent in the post-Cold War period.
Using different sets of robustness tests, we show that our findings hold when conducting logistic
regressions and include control variables, such as dummies for different regions, economic devel-
opment, and high-quality democracies. We also show that the proposed relationship holds for all
interveners of the dataset, and that our findings are robust to using alternative coding rules, dif-
ferent sample definitions, and using polarization measures based on machine-learning algorithms.
In addition, we also find that our pre-election polarization measurements have broader implica-
tions: they align with greater criticism of election when the opposition is pro-American based on
an analysis of the Congressional record. Our polarization measurement also predicts post-election
changes in relations with the US as measured by the NELDA dataset.
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Elections, and foreign interest in them, sit at the intersection of numerous fields of inquiry. Other
scholars may build on our contribution to explain why outsiders provide aid to some regimes (to
prop up a friendly incumbent), to account for why corruption is tolerated in some countries (to
prevent an unfriendly opposition from coming to power) and to explore when leadership changes
produce changes in foreign policy orientation. Our general approach and empirical contribution
should prove a germane departure point for these, and other questions of interest.
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A Appendix: Short Theoretical Model
This section illustrates our theoretical considerations by formally deriving our main hypotheses
in simple formal model and solve it. We assume that the true level of support the incumbent is
x. Additionally, there is an initial level of bias b in favor of the incumbent. The foreign power
can change the result of the election by supporting the incumbent via candidate support c > 0
or it can reduce/increase the bias of an election via process interventions p, resulting in a bias
β (p) = b−√bp. We assume that the effectiveness of process interventions depends on the initial
level of bias.35 The result of the election will be:36
f (c, p) = x+ c+(b−
√
bp)
We assume that the election result determines the policies according to the vote shares of the plat-
forms Agov and Bopp and that interventions are costly (quadratic loss terms). The importance of the
election result in a particular country will be determined by the parameter Γ.37 The maximization
problem of a foreign power is thus:
max
c,p
Γ( f (c, p) ·Agov+(1− f (c, p)) ·Bopp)− c2− p2
For a more compact statement, we define polarization as: pi = Agov−Bopp, such that intervener
prefers government to win when pi > 0 and the opposition to win if pi < 0. Hence, we need to solve










We can then solve the maximization problem of the foreign power by taking first order conditions.
The optimal intervention is characterized by c∗ = piΓ2 with
∂c∗







∂pi < 0 (cf. Hypothesis 2).
35In consolidated democracies with a very low level of b this would make process support rather ineffective.
36We need to restrict c, p such that f (c, p) ∈ [0,1] or use an appropriate transformation (e.g. via a logistic function).
37It is possible to introduce an additional term that captures the degree to which the foreign power cares about
clean elections (low levels of the resulting bias β ). In further extensions one could also introduce interactions between
process interventions (p) and candidate interventions (c). The most promising direction for further research would
however be a model that explicitly models voter preferences.
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